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This paper provides an updated assessment
of capital flight from Papua New Guinea,
reviews methods of measuring capital flight
and suggests that balance of payments data
on capital flows give a more revealing picture
than the residuals method used by most
authors (including Duncan 1995). Data used
by those authors are updated and compared
with additional disaggregated data on equity
flows, from Papua New Guinean and
Australian sources respectively, that have
become available since 1995.
Evaluation of this new data, using a
counter-factual case-study of the Lihir gold
mining project to determine the warranted
or ‘normal’ level of capital outflows from the
mining sector (which accounts for 80 per cent
of all equity investment in Papua New
Guinea), suggests that most apparent capital
flight from Papua New Guinea is the result of
the continuous depreciation of the kina since
1994. The fall in the kina’s value makes it
appear that more loans have been repatriated
than were ever received. Such enhanced
capital outflows are foreign exchange losses
to the entities concerned. But they will
usually have been more than offset by foreign
exchange gains if they—as in most cases—
were engaged in extractive industries, the
value of whose exports went up when
denoted in the falling kina.
These new data also cast some doubt on
Duncan’s assessment that capital flight (in
the sense of large net equity outflows from
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Papua New Guinea) began to be a serious
problem in 1992, since net inflows from
Australia, source of at least two-thirds of
equity investment in Papua New Guinea,
continued at least until June 2000 (when that
data series ends). These data also show that
the recorded net inflows would have been
larger but for investment abroad by PNG
entities. The data cannot of course show
what the level of foreign investment might
have been had either the various govern-
ments of Papua New Guinea since 1992 been
more successful in managing the economy
and tackling key deterrents to investment like
deficient law and order and the primitive
land tenure system, or the managements of
the leading mineral companies made greater
efforts to produce an adequate return to their
investors.
Estimating capital flight in Papua
New Guinea
Some authors have commented that ‘capital
flight’ could be considered a somewhat
pejorative term for what statistically is merely
an outflow of investment from one country
to others, since if there was no capital flight
from at least one country, there would be no
inward investment into any other country.
As Williamson and Lessard put it,
…one refers to capital flight by Latin
Americans but not by Japanese because
of a belief that Latin investors are trying
to escape the high risks they perceive
at home while Japanese investors are
responding to what they perceive to be
better opportunities abroad (1987:2).
Thus the standard definition suggests
improbably that Australia is Papua New
Guinea’s fellow sufferer from capital flight.
Duncan also noted that some outward
capital movements ‘may include legitimate
portfolio diversification’ (1995:87) of both the
banking and non-banking sectors of the
capital-exporting country, and there is some
evidence that this has occurred in Papua
New Guinea. Such capital exports are
questionable when, by any measure, Papua
New Guinea suffers from a severe shortage
of investment. In that context, the apparent
large net outflows of private capital in every
year bar one since 1991 (Table 1) seem to be a
very surprising indication of apparently less
attractive opportunities for investment there
than in a mature economy like Australia.
Australia has been the main destination for
private capital leaving Papua New Guinea.
Indeed, in current kina terms there seems to
have been a cumulative net disinvestment in
Papua New Guinea since 1976. Even in
Australian dollar terms, the cumulative net
flow of total foreign capital into Papua New
Guinea since 1975 had sunk to just A$4
million by 2001, but this phenomenon is
almost wholly due to the fall in the kina’s
exchange rate since 1992.1
The World Bank’s standard definition of
capital flight as used by Duncan produces
much lower estimates of capital flight from
Papua New Guinea than the data on total
net private capital flows in the official
balance of payments data. This is because
the standard definition classifies capital
flight as being limited to only those flows on
the capital account that are not accounted
for by changes in foreign exchange reserves,
net (private) foreign capital flows, and net
changes in (official) external debt. Defined in
this way, capital flight is merely a residual,
representing unrecorded flows, and is often
no different from the ‘errors and omission’
data found in all balance of payments
statements. Cuddington (1986:7) defines
capital flight as merely errors and omissions
plus any recorded short-term flows. The World
Bank definition of capital flight produces for
Australia a series identical to the errors and
omissions line in the balance of payments,
and the same is true in the PNG data if non-
official monetary sector transactions and
changes in offshore balances are taken into
account (see Table 1).
The World Bank’s definition derives
from standard accounting conventions
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whereby the surplus (or deficit) on the
current account of the balance of payments
is matched by a deficit (or surplus) on the
capital account.
Crbal = -Cpbal = -(dRes + fDi + dExt + CpFt)(1)
Rearranging,
-CpFt = -Crbal – dRes – fDi - dExt (2)
where the current account balance is Crbal
and positively signed if in surplus, Cpbal is
the capital account balance, signed negative
if Crbal is positive, which comprises the
change in foreign exchange reserves dRes, net
foreign direct investment fDi, and changes
in external debt dExt and capital flight CpFt.
Positive dRes denotes a decrease in reserves,
as running down reserves is equivalent to
obtaining a capital inflow, while positive net
fDi is signed positive. Negative net CpFt
indicates capital flight.
Because ‘capital flight’, as it is defined
here, relates only to the capital account, it
may well miss outflows on current account
that are really repatriations of capital. Such
disguised capital outflows could take the
form of under-invoicing of exports and over-
invoicing of imports. One potential example
of this is the disparity between coffee export
volumes and proceeds reported by Papua
New Guinea’s Coffee Industry Corporation
(CIC) and those reported by the Bank of Papua
New Guinea (BPNG) and incorporated in the
current account of the balance of payments.
Under-reporting of coffee exports to BPNG
would imply increased actual but potentially
unmeasured capital flight.2
The Bank of Papua New Guinea is also
known to be concerned that there have been
instances of companies seeking to remit
dividends beyond the declared profitability
of the firm as a means of evading exchange
control restrictions on capital movements.3
This practice does not seem to be widespread,
however, since there appears to be no trend
for recorded invisible debits on the current
account (which include dividends) to grow
more rapidly than credits (see Table 1). On
the contrary, dividend payments abroad in
1998 in kina terms were no higher than in
1994, and much lower in Australian dollar
terms (Table 2 and BPNG 1999:35).
Papua New Guinea’s balance of payments
data include separate entries for non-official
monetary flows (for example, changes in
foreign assets of the commercial banks) and
(since 1990) changes in offshore accounts.
Offshore accounts comprise mainly balances
that the mining and petroleum companies
are allowed to retain to meet their immediate
forward offshore financing commitments, as
a means of avoiding the large short-term
inflows and  outflows that would otherwise
occur. It seems that Duncan (1995) may have
included these items in his capital flight
residual. In most years, however, movements
in these offshore balances account for much
of capital flight as defined, and thereby
distract attention from the much larger net
outflow of foreign direct investment since
1991 (Table 1). The contrast is very evident
in Figure 1, which applies the standard
definition with changes in the offshore
accounts and non-official capital flows
excluded from recorded private sector capital
flows and shows how these items closely
followed private sector capital flows. In each
case, defined ‘capital flight’ is far outweighed
by the net outflow of private capital. The
overall magnitude of the exodus of capital
from Papua New Guinea since 1991, when
capital flight is added to net private capital
flows, seems nothing short of horrendous
(Figure 2).
The disaggregated data on equity flows
and loan drawdowns and repayments in
Table 2, however, suggest a more complex
situation. There was a cumulative net equity
inflow of 1.4 billion kina and an implied net
outflow of private loan financing of 2.9
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billion kina from 1990 to 1998, giving an
overall net outflow of private capital of
1.5 billion kina. Possible explanations for
this outflow are provided in the next section.
Equity investment in Papua New
Guinea
This section puts capital flight in the context
of data on the level, ownership and sectoral
composition of investment in Papua New
Guinea. Total foreign equity investment in
Papua New Guinea had reached 2.6 billion
kina by 1998 (the latest year for which data
are available), but in Australian dollar terms
there appeared to be a fall, to A$2 billion
(Table 2). This figure results from the kina’s
depreciation and is not confirmed by the
Australian data. Expressing total foreign
equity holdings as a percentage of GDP
shows a decline from 55 per cent in 1990 to
34 per cent in 1998. That decline could be
interpreted as fulfilment of the aspiration in
Papua New Guinea’s Constitution for
economic growth to be subordinated to self-
reliance, but it also helps explain the decline
in the country’s rate of economic growth
through the later 1990s.
Australia remained the chief source of
foreign equity in 1990–98 (up to 72 per cent
in 1994), and the mineral sector accounted
for around 80 per cent of total equity
investment throughout the same period,
despite the closure of the Panguna mine in
1989. The small share of the agriculture sector
in foreign equity holdings stands out in the
BPNG data, at less than 5 per cent in 1997
(BPNG 1999:33), and most of that is in the oil
palm industry.
Table 2 also provides BPNG data from
1990 to 1998 on equity flows, implying that
recorded net equity outflows were experienced
only in 1992 and 1993. Dividend payments
reached rates of at least 12 per cent of total
foreign equity holdings between 1992 and
1997, having recovered from the low of 2 per
cent in 1990 resulting from the closure of the
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Figure 1 Capital flight and private capital flows with and without offshore balances, 1977–2001
(million kina)
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1998. Money and Banking in Papua New Guinea, Bank of Papua New
Guinea, Port Moresby; Bank of Papua New Guinea, 2001. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Bank of Papua New
Guinea, Port Moresby.
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Panguna mine, before declining to 9 per cent
in 1998, when the economy first entered into
the recession from which it has yet to emerge.
The equity holdings in the BPNG data are
valued at historical cost rather than current
market values, so the apparently high
dividend yields of as much as 16–17 per cent
in 1995–96 are not comparable with normal
market yields of 6 per cent or less in Australia.
Thus, this data provides no prima facie
evidence of overstated dividends masking
capital flight.
Turning now to the huge net outflow
(nearly 3 billion kina) of total private capital
(including loans) from 1990 to 1998 (excluding
movements in offshore balances), how is one
to explain that seemingly foreign private
sector loans gave rise to repayments larger
than the original loans? The net outflow of
private funds of 2.9 billion kina between
1990 and 1998 comprises a mix of funds
flowing from the banking system on its own
account and resident Papua New Guineans
borrowing at home to invest abroad. There
were some significant increases in the
commercial banks’ net foreign assets, which
were negative throughout the 1980s and then
increased from 85.4 million kina (A$129
million) in 1993 to 171.5 million kina (A$132
million) in 1998 and 330.9 million kina
(A$181 million) in 2001, but this falls well
short of the total apparent increase in net
lending abroad.
It is also possible that the BPNG data
on equity flows in Table 2 are incomplete,
for it is surprising to see apparently only
477 million kina of aggregate capital inflows
in 1990 and 1991 when the Porgera and
Kutubu projects were under construction,
representing a total investment of over US$2
billion, of which ostensibly 25 per cent
represented equity.4 In striking contrast, the
international Lihir Initial Public Offering
(IPO, that is, share float) in 1995 explains
most of the large equity inflow of 762 million
kina in that year, and similarly the IPO of
49 per cent of state-owned Orogen Minerals
Ltd in 1996 explains the large equity inflow
in that year.
The large loan repayments in 1993–96
are consistent with the repayments due on
the loan financing of the Porgera and Kutubu
projects, but not with the apparent lack of
significant net loan drawdowns for
construction of those projects in 1990 and 1991.
One explanation here is that much of the
capital investment in those projects was
incurred offshore (for example, oxygen plants
and autoclaves for Porgera) and that the
financing of these projects was not inscribed
in the capital account of the balance of
payments, even though the declared landed
cost would have entered the imports section
of the current account. Moreover most (for
example, Placer, Chevron, BP, BHP) of the
joint venture partners in both Porgera and
Kutubu financed their shares of the capital
costs from their parent companies’ own
resources—only Highlands (Porgera) and
Oil Search (Kutubu) resorted to direct equity
raisings.
Duncan’s data imply that the first
seriously large capital flight began as early
as 1990, after the closure of the Panguna
copper mine in Bougainville in 1989. The data
in Table 2 show that there were continuing
net inflows of equity in 1990 and 1991, due
partly to the investments in the Porgera
gold mine from 1989 to 1990 and in the
Kutubu oilfield from 1990 to 1991, which
offset outflows occasioned by the events in
Bougainville. Net outflows of equity in
1992 and 1993 were followed by a resumption
of net inflows until 1998.
The sudden surge in outflows of equity
in the years 1993 to 1996, averaging 239
million kina per annum after previous
annual outflows of less than 22 million kina,
is likely to be predominantly investment
abroad by Papua New Guinean entities,
since there is no evidence of mineral sector
disinvestments. Mineral sector investment
accounts for over 80 per cent of all foreign
investment in Papua New Guinea.
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Moreover, until 1997, repatriation of capital
by companies required court approval if it
involved a reduction of capital, and this
would normally apply only at the end of a
project’s life in the case of mineral projects.5
In addition, foreign exchange control
regulations limit dividends payable to being
not more than ‘distributable profits’ as
defined in the various project agreements.
The coming to power of the People’s
Democratic Movement (PDM) party led by
Paias Wingti in 1992 and its immediate
demand for additional state equity in the
Porgera Joint Venture, took the state’s holding
from 10 to 30 per cent, and was to be paid for
‘at cost’ rather than current market value.
This action led to sharp declines in the value
of the shares of all mining companies active
in Papua New Guinea. The subsequent
agreement of the joint venture partners to
divest 5 per cent each from their individual
holdings to the state, reducing their individual
holdings from 30 to 25 per cent, to be paid for
at a discounted notional market price from
the future net profits of the transferred equity,
did little to restore confidence. Ironically, this
forced sale of equity to the state was an
imposed removal of foreign investment funds
that might otherwise have been reinvested
in mineral exploration in Papua New
Guinea!6
Subsequently, there has been only one
year (1997) since 1991 where there has been
net aggregate (that is, debt and equity)
inward direct investment. This is partly due
to the rapid increases in the foreign assets of
Papua New Guinea’s commercial banks,
reaching 445.1 million kina by April 2002
compared to 278 million kina in September
2000. This means that much of the recent
net dis-investment in Papua New Guinea
comprises offshore investment by its own
residents. The resumption of net outflows
since 1997 might seem to reflect continuing
lack of confidence in successive governments’
management of the economy, but falling
levels of mineral exploration throughout the
world after the declines in oil and gold prices
from 1996 to 1999 may well have been a
contributory factor.7 Overriding such factors
has been the impact of the fall in the kina on
the nominal value of capital outflows in the
form of loan repayments. Thus, as shown in
the next section, the Australian data show
continuing net investment in Papua New
Guinea at least until 2000.
The balance of equity flows
between Papua New Guinea and
Australia
Some insights into potential capital flight
from Papua New Guinea to Australia may
be gained from Australian balance of
payments statistics, as summarised in Tables
3 and 4. Over the six years 1994/95–1999/
2000, Australia enjoyed a favourable trade
balance in three years (1996/97–1998/99)
and deficits in three years (1994–95, 1995–
96 and 1999–2000). Credits on services
always exceeded debits, and income credits
(such as dividends) also always exceeded
debits. There is no evidence of any trend for
dividends payable to Papua New Guinea to
increase, suggesting that capital flight from
Papua New Guinea in the form of portfolio
investment in Australia, if it has occurred,
has not been profitable. Australia’s grants
in aid to Papua New Guinea explain the
large transfer debits.
While there is clear evidence of
continuing investment in Papua New Guinea
by Australia, with the level of total investment
rising from A$1.9 billion in 1994–95 to
A$3.52 billion in 1999–00, the evidence
points to disinvestments from Australia by
residents of Papua New Guinea, resulting
in a fall in the level of Papua New Guinea’s
portfolio in Australia from A$184 million in
1994–95 to A$167 million in 1999–00, with
only two years of significant increases (A$72
million in 1995–96 and A$180 million in
1997–98). The apparent continuing growth
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Figure 2 Aggregate private capital flows, 1977–2001 (million kina)
of net Australian equity investment in Papua
New Guinea is significant given some large
nominal disinvestments, such as when Oil
Search Ltd, registered in Papua New Guinea,
acquired BP’s interests in the Kutubu oil fields.
Additional Australian data on equity
flows between the two countries (Australian
Bureau of Statistics 2001:75–78) show
continuing net investment into Papua New
Guinea from 1991 to 2000, with only one net
outflow, in 1995–96 (see Table 3). The outcome
is a doubling in the level of Australian
investment in Papua New Guinea in that
period, from A$1.687 billion in 1990–91 to
A$3.52 billion in 1999–2000. The Australian
data for investment in Australia from Papua
New Guinea also show some increasing net
investment between 1990–91 and 1999–2000,
from negative A$71 million to A$167 million,
but this is well short of the flow into Papua
New Guinea (Table 5).
Comparing the data on their bilateral
equity flows from the Australian and PNG
sources gives a mixed picture, with not much
correlation for the nine years (1990–1998) in
which there are data from both sources (Table
3). Unexpectedly, in some years it is the PNG
source that seems the more reliable. For
example, the Australian data originally
showed a net withdrawal of investment from
Papua New Guinea of A$348 million in
1995–96 (Australian Bureau of Statistics
1997:56), the year in which Lihir Gold Ltd
raised no less than A$600 million in its IPO
on the Australian Stock Exchange.8 Perhaps
this float explains the later revised figure for
Australia’s investment in Papua New
Guinea that year to only negative A$62
million (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2001:75).
The Australian data, however, show a
large net investment in Papua New Guinea
of A$385 million in 1996–97 when the Orogen
Minerals IPO in Sydney raised over A$300
million, most of which was subscribed in
Australia. Some significant Australian
disinvestments from Papua New Guinea
came later, with the progressive disposal by
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1998. Money and Banking in Papua New Guinea, Bank of Papua New
Guinea, Port Moresby; Bank of Papua New Guinea, 2001. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Bank of Papua New
Guinea, Port Moresby.
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Table 2 Foreign equity investment in Papua New Guinea 1990–98
Million kina 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Foreign equity holdings (million kina) 1,696 1,761 1,719 1,671 1,842 2,225 2,598 2,645 2625
of which Australia (million kina) 965 1,008 1,092 1,134 1,325 1,420 1,617 1,683 1,684
Australia (per cent total) 57 57 64 68 72 64 62 64 64
of which in mineral sector (million kina) 1,414 1,442 1,395 1,341 1,460 1,834 2,061 2,105 2,104
Minerals (per cent of total) 83 82 81 80 79 82 79 80 80
Total (per cent of GDP) 55 49 42 33 34 35 38 39 34
Dividend payments (million kina) 34 139 217 230 238 377 421 322 232
of which to Australia (million kina) 23 84 151 132 158 286 249 199 118
Australia (per cent total) 68 60 70 57 66 76 59 62 51
Dividends (per cent of equity) 2 8 13 14 13 17 16 12 9
Equity flows (million kina)
Inward (million kina) 388 89 137 134 181 762 863 136 6
of which Australia (million kina) 127 46 130 103 97 292 568 112 1
Australia as per cent total 33 52 95 77 54 38 66 82 17
Outward (million kina) 8 21 177 177 138 292 413 39 13
of which Australia (million kina) 5 2 46 61 20 169 293 - -
Australia as per cent total 63 10 26 34 14 58 71 - -
Net equity flow 380 68 –40 –43 43 470 450 97 –7
Cumulative net equity flow from 1990 380 448 408 365 408 878 1,328 1,425 1,418
Total private capital flows
(balance of payments*) 90 174 –176 –613 –557 –193 –147 131 –189
Cumulative total private capital
(balance of payments) 90 264 88 –525 –1,082 –1,275 –1,422 –1,291 –1,480
* Includes loans disbursed/repaid –290 106 –136 –570 –600 –663 –597 34 –182
Cumulative flow of
loans/repayments –290 –184 –320 –890 –1,490 –2,153 –2,750 –2,716 –2,898
A$ million 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Foreign equity holdings (A$ million) 2,309 2,433 2,528 2,519 2,013 2,264 2,508 2,477 2,023
of which: Australia (A$ million) 1,314 1,393 1,606 1,710 1,448 1,445 1,561 1,576 1,298
Australia as per cent total 77.5 79.1 93.4 102.3 78.6 64.9 60.1 59.6 49.5
of which in mineral sector (A$ million) 1,925 1,993 2,052 2,022 1,595 1,866 1,990 1,971 1,622
Mineral as per cent of total 113.5 113.2 119.4 121.0 86.6 83.9 76.6 74.5 61.8
Total as per cent of GDP 74.9 67.7 61.8 49.8 37.2 35.6 36.7 36.5 26.2
Dividend payments (A$ million) 46.3 192.1 319.2 346.8 260.1 383.6 406.4 301.6 178.8
of which to Australia (A$ million) 31.3 116.1 222.1 199.0 172.7 291.0 240.4 186.4 91.0
Australia (per cent total) 92.1 83.5 102.4 86.5 72.5 77.2 57.1 57.9 39.2
Dividends (per cent of equity) 2.7 10.9 18.6 20.8 14.1 17.2 15.6 11.4 6.8
Equity flows (A$ million)
Inward 528.3 123.0 202.0 202.0 197.8 775.4 833.1 127.4 4.6
of which Australia 172.9 63.6 191.2 155.3 106.0 297.1 548.3 104.9 0.8
Australia (per cent total) 44.6 71.4 139.6 115.9 58.6 39.0 63.5 77.1 12.9
Outward 10.9 29.0 260.3 266.9 150.8 297.0 398.7 36.5 10.1
of which Australia 6.8 2.8 67.7 92.0 21.9 172.0 282.9 - -
Australia (per cent total) 85.1 13.2 38.2 52.0 15.8 58.9 68.5 - -
Net equity flow 517.4 93.9 –58.8 –64.8 47.0 478.3 434.4 90.8 –5.4
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BHP of its 9.7 per cent stake in the Kutubu
and adjoining oilfields in 2000, its 51 per cent
stake in Ok Tedi Mining Ltd in 2001, and in
2002 its steel fabrication and sales operations
in Port Moresby and Lae, but these came after
the most recent years for which Australian
data are available. BHP’s oilfield stakes were
acquired by one of the other foreign investors,
and its steel operations were acquired by an
investor from the Philippines, so there were
probably no overall reductions in foreign
equity investment in Papua New Guinea
arising from these transactions.
Evaluation
Capital flight is not intended to refer merely
to an outflow of investment from one country
to another, since the object of concern is
capital outflows that are stimulated by high
or increased levels of sovereign risk. But the
unavoidable statistical difficulty is that
balance of payments data generally do not
distinguish between ‘normal’ outflows such
as those that arise from repayments of foreign
loans, and loans abroad extended by resident
individuals and companies, and those
disinvestments of equity by foreigners and
investments abroad by residents that may be
considered to constitute capital flight. Since
the aim is to observe unexpected outward
flows, any sudden decreases in equity
inflows—or increases in outflows—would
generally indicate symptoms of capital flight
in the sense of divestment by both foreigners
and nationals.
Moreover, since Papua New Guinea,
like other developing countries, could be
considered to have insufficient capital, it
would no doubt like to see a steady stream of
net capital inflow over time. This would allow
a current account deficit, which could indicate
increasing imports of capital equipment for
investment projects. In practice, Papua New
Guinea has only ever experienced deficits in
its balance of trade in the years 1980–84, and
that was when the kina was its strongest and
the relative prices of Papua New Guinea’s
imports were at their lowest. In all other years
since 1975 when Papua New Guinea became
independent it has had trade surpluses,
suggesting that, if trade deficits indicate lack
of investment and capital flight, that has been
a problem from the beginning (as it may well
have been).
In Papua New Guinea’s case one might
expect to see a different pattern of flows over
Cumulative net equity flow
from 1990 517 619 600 550 446 894 1,282 1,335 1,093
Total private capital flows,
balance of payments* 122.5 240.4 –258.9 –924.2 –608.6 –196.4 –141.9 122.7 –145.7
Cumulative total private
capital (balance of payments) 123 365 129 –792 –1,182 –1,297 –1,373 –1,209 –1,141
* Includes loans disbursed/repaid –394.9 146.5 –200.0 –859.4 –655.6 –674.7 –576.3 31.8 –140.3
Cumulative flow of loans/repayments –395 –254 –471 –1,342 –1,628 –2,191 –2,655 –2,544 –2,234
Summary
Cumulative equity flows
  (A$ million, PNG data) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Inward from Australia 173 237 428 583 689 986 1,534 1,639 1,640
Outward to Australia 6.8 9.6 77.2 169.2 191.1 363.0 645.9 645.9 645.9
Sources: Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1995. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, March, Port Moresby; Bank of
Papua New Guinea, 1999. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, March, Port Moresby.
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time than in some other developing countries.
The country has a generally poor investment
climate for most forms of investment but for
much of the period since 1975 has had a
reasonably good climate for investment in
minerals. Hence, in the absence of sudden
increases in sovereign risk, the expected
pattern of capital flows would be short periods
of large net inflows due to the development of
mining projects followed by long periods of
steady net outflows comprising capital
repayments. Sudden large net outflows tends
to suggest the presence of capital flight.
The question is how far the recent net
flows of capital in Papua New Guinea fit the
ideal picture? Duncan (1995) has suggested
that, until the early 1990s, the sustained
aggregate net private capital inflows in
Papua New Guinea indicated an economy
that was not dominated by mining but held
a broadly diversified interest for foreign and
domestic investors. He also argues that, since
1992, concerns over the security of tenure of
foreign investment have led to net outflows
rather than a steady inflow of new capital to
offset repayment of past foreign loans and
ideally also dividend outflows on the current
account.
The data from the PNG side for the period
1990–98 both in kina and when restated in
Australian dollars in Table 2 only partly
confirm this prognosis.
• Foreign equity holdings grew strongly
from 1.7 billion kina in 1990 to 2.6 billion
kina in 1996, but only from A$2.3 billion
in 1990 to A$2.5 billion in 1997 and 1998.
However, the depreciation of the kina from
A$1.36 in 1990 to A$0.77 in 1998 both
exaggerates later capital inflows in kina
terms and understates the Australian
dollar value in 1998 of earlier investments
made from 1990 to 1994.
• The mineral sector claimed the dominant
share of equity investment throughout
the period at a steady 80 per cent of the
total, indicating a continuing lack of
growth of investment opportunities in all
other sectors of the economy.
• There was an unexpected tendency
(given the ‘look North’ policy of the
Wingti and Chan governments that held
office between 1992 and 1997) for equity
investment from Australia to be a rising
proportion of the total. It increased from
57 per cent in 1990 to as much as 72 per
cent in 1994 and was still as high as 64
per cent in 1998.
• There were cumulative total equity
inflows of A$2.99 billion, which after
allowing for reverse equity flows of
A$1.46 billion produced cumulative net
equity inflows from 1990 to 1998 of
A$1.5 billion (see Table 2). The last figure
belies any presence of net capital flight
in this period, but the net inflow would
have been much larger had it not been
for the significant increase in equity
outflows, especially in the period of the
Wingti–Chan governments of 1992–97.
For example, the cumulative inflow from
Australia of A$1.6 billion in 1990–98 was
partially offset by the outflow to Australia
of A$646 million. The data do not indicate
how much of this flow was undertaken
by Australian entities, but certainly some
was portfolio diversification by Papua
New Guinean entities, of which the
purchase of the Cairns Conservatory by
Papua New Guinea’s Public Officers
Superannuation Fund (POSF) in 1994
became a notorious example.9
• A comparison of the data on equity flows
in Table 2 with the balance of payments
data on total private capital flows in
Table 1 (summarised at the bottom of
Table 2) indicates that the net inflow of
equity capital was not sufficient to offset
the very large net outflows of loan capital
arising from loan repayments far
exceeding loan drawdowns between
1990 and 1998. Only in 1991 and 1997
were there net loan drawdowns. Total
net private loan capital movement
between 1990 and 1998 was no less than
A$3.3 billion, resulting in the total
outflow of net private capital of A$1.79
billion in that period.
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Table 4 Balance of payments between Australia and Papua New Guinea* (A$ million)
1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Current account
Exports 941 1,056 1,281 1,158 1,019 935
Imports –1,133 –1,229 –1,100 –772 –784 –1,366
Services
Credits 240 236 279 335 291 371
Debits –134 –162 –174 –222 –151 –162
Income
Credits 95 140 273 119 150 139
Debits –12 –18 6 –9 –14 –13
Transfers
Credits 7 6 7 6 5 5
Debits –307 –285 –259 –341 –364 –356
Current account balance –303 –256 313 274 152 –447
Capital account
Investment transactions
  to Papua New Guinea –10 62 –385 –132 –46 –185
  from Papua New Guinea 9 72 –126 180 –150 –58
Notes: * All data are reported from Australia’s perspective. For example, the negative current account
balance in 1994–95 represents a surplus from Papua New Guinea’s perspective.
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001. Balance of Payments and International Investment Position,
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.
Table   3 Levels and flows of equity investment, 1990–2000 (at 30 June)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Australian investment in PNG .. 144 138 146 257 10 –62 385 132 46 185
Cumulative 1991–2000 .. 144 282 428 685 695 633 1,018 1,150 1,196 1,381
PNG investment in Australia . . –93 63 –56 33 9 72 –126 180 –150 –58
Net flow Australia to PNG (A$ million) 237 75 202 224 1 –134 511 –48 196 243 ..
Net flow Australia to PNG (kina million)a 122 44 84 42 77 123 275 112 1 .. . .
Australian investment in PNG
Direct, equity . . 1,076 1,361 1,870 2,115 2,107 1,351 .. . . . . . .
Other direct . . 70 102 239 –389 –188 –117 .. . . . . . .
Portfolio, reserve assets, n.e.s. . . 541 536 413 252 411 420 .. . . . . . .
Total Australian investment in PNG 1,687 1,999 2,291 2,381 2,330 1,654 2,361 2,626 2,608 3,520 ..
PNG investment in Australia . . –71 6 113 173 184 259 175 401 228 167
a Year ending 31 December.
Notes: Signing conventions vary in these issues; here positives indicate a net increase in Australian
investments in Papua New Guinea, and likewise for PNG investments in Australia.
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, (various issues: 1996–97, 1999–2000). Balance of Payments and
International Investment Position, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra; Papua New Guinea data:Table 2.
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• Thus, as noted above, the real ‘problem’
of capital flight faced by Papua New
Guinea’s financial policymakers has been
net repatriation of loan capital. The end
result has been a reversal of the cumulative
positive net private capital inflow of
2 billion kina between 1977 and 1991 to
the negative 1.4 billion kina between 1977
and 2001 (see Table 1). The next section
considers the ‘counter-factual’ for this
outcome, namely, how far the net outflow
can be justified by reference either to the
‘normal’ capital flows that should be
expected in a developing country like
Papua New Guinea or to the continuous
depreciation of the kina after 1994.
• Australia’s data on its private
investment in Papua New Guinea since
1990 shows only one year of net outflow,
1996, and shows cumulative growth in
the level of its investment reaching
A$2.6 billion in June 1998 (the lower
PNG figure of A$1.3 billion at December
1998 results from using the devalued
kina/A$ exchange rate) and A$3.5
billion by June 2000 (Table 3). This
provides no evidence of ‘net capital
flight’, rather the reverse, but the
Australian data on balance of payments
flows do not include information on non-
equity capital flows between the two
countries. Even if they did, they would
not capture drawdowns and repayments
of the main loans used to construct the
largest private sector investments in
Papua New Guinea since 1980, namely
the mineral projects at Ok Tedi (1980–
86), Porgera (1988–91), Kutubu (1990–
92), and Lihir (1995–98), since these were
largely provided from non-Australian
sources. For example, Lihir ’s loan
finance was mostly denominated in US
dollars and provided by a consortium of
international banks led by the Union
Bank of Switzerland.
A counter-factual model
In order to provide substance to the concept
of what an ideal pattern of inflows and
outflows should look like, as opposed to the
statistical record of capital flows discussed
above, it should in principle be possible to
map the inflows of capital for mining
development and the expected outflows for
the life of the projects to show what the
pattern of net flows would have been in the
absence of periods of increased sovereign
risk. This counter-factual would provide a
kind of benchmark against which to evaluate
the statistical record.
In practice this can be quite difficult.
First, only two of the major mining projects
in Papua New Guinea were developed by
stand-alone quoted public companies whose
accounts are therefore in the public domain.
They are Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) and
Lihir Gold Ltd (LGL). Ok Tedi Mining Ltd
(OTML) and Misima Mining Ltd are not
quoted companies, so comprehensive annual
financial statements remain unpublished,
and Porgera and Kutubu are both joint
ventures with a number of partners of whom
now only one is a project specific company
(Oil Search Ltd). Second, the nature of mining
is that capital investment continues through
most of the project’s life, and the funding of
such reinvestment when financed internally
from cash flow is not easily tracked.
Setting aside BCL’s mine at Panguna in
Bougainville, since it ceased production in
1989 and capital flows associated with it had
ended by the time capital flight became a
perceived problem in Papua New Guinea,
the Kutubu and Lihir projects could serve as
models for the counter-factual. In the case of
the Kutubu project, however, the only
published accounts are those of Oil Search
Ltd, which began with only a 10 per cent
stake in the project as well as having some
non-Kutubu assets (chiefly a share in the
Hides gas project). Furthermore, Lihir is a
special case because it was wholly financed
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by the proceeds of its IPO float in 1995 and
international bank loans, whereas projects
like Porgera and Kutubu were largely
financed from internal resources of their
promoters. Oil Search is also a problematic
model because of the large capital raisings
(US$373 million) that enabled it to buy out
BP’s stake in both Kutubu and Hides in 1998.
While these did not produce a net inflow of
capital in 1998 because BP repatriated its
proceeds (see Table 6), they led to outflows
in later years (and reduced the tax payable
from these projects because the interest on
the financing was tax deductible). Lihir is a
special case because the proposed share of
debt in its total capital cost was 60 per cent,
whereas the Bank of Papua New Guinea
allowed those mining project companies that
financed their projects from their own
resources to deem that 75 per cent of the
capital cost was debt financing (50 per cent
in the case of petroleum).
Implied capital flows derived from
Lihir’s feasibility study and float prospectus
of 1995 are summarised in Table 5. The equity
raised in the float was US$450 million, and
debt financing of US$292 million was
envisaged. Also shown in Table 5 are the
actual loan drawdowns and repayments
from 1995 to 2001, together with equity
drawdowns (including proceeds of further
equity raised in 1998 and 1999), with
conversions into kina at (1) the exchange rate
of US$1.00=1.35 kina in 1995 and (2) the
actual exchange rates since 1995. Table 5
shows that the feasibility study under-
estimated capital requirements, necessitating
additional equity raisings (of which part was
used to accelerate debt repayment).
The main implications of the data in
Table 5 are that
• there is no evidence of capital
repatriation in excess of the capital
invested, along with confirmation that
the appearance of capital flight from
Papua New Guinea since 1992 is very
largely a consequence of the depreciation
of the kina from September 1994. Thus,
whereas the feasibility study anticipated
debt repayments totalling US$292 million
or 394 million kina, actual debt repay-
ments had reached US$290 million or
792 million kina by the end of 2001.
• Comparison in Table 5 of realised capital
outflows from Lihir from 1999 (when its
loan repayments began in earnest) with
the reported net private capital outflows
in the balance of payments (Table 1)
shows that LGL’s debt repayments
accounted for 27 per cent of net private
capital outflows in 1999, 47 per cent in
2000, and 41 per cent in 2001. This
indicates a significant correlation,
whereas, if the counter-factual were to
imply the existence of capital flight in the
sense of much larger outflows than could
be explained by outflows from the mineral
sector, then net outflows should have been
growing much more rapidly than the
outflow from this major mining project.
Once again the data here suggest that
the concept of capital flight, in the sense of
disinvestment by foreign entities, is something
of a chimera, consistent with the Australian
data in Table 3. They show no net reduction
in the level of Australian equity investment
in Papua New Guinea up to June 2000. As
shown earlier, most of the apparent capital
flight from Papua New Guinea is
attributable to the exchange losses on loan
repayments arising from the devaluation of
the kina, although the increasing foreign
assets of the commercial banks suggests that
Papua New Guinean entities have increased
their investments abroad. In any case,
reductions of capital require approval by the
courts. So, although the Lihir feasibility
study projected availability of funds for
capital reduction, no such reductions have
been sought or allowed there or in any other
mineral project in Papua New Guinea
(except in the cases of Niugini Mining Ltd
when its operations ended after it was taken
over by LGL in 1999, and Orogen Minerals
Ltd when it was shut down after being taken
over by Oil Search Ltd in 2002).
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There have, however, been a few recent
partial disinvestments by foreign mineral
equity owners in Papua New Guinea. These
include BP’s sale of its interests in the Hides
gas and Kutubu oil projects to Oil Search Ltd,
the latter being registered in Papua New
Guinea. Most of its equity, however, is held
abroad, so this was in practice merely a
rearrangement of foreign ownership similar
to that when BHP divested its oil interests to
Exxon, another foreign company.10
Another instance of divestment that was
more apparent than real was LGL’s buying
out of Battle Mountain (US) from its majority
control of Niugini Mining Ltd and then
absorbing the latter in LGL—as with Oil
Search, most (by value of holding) of LGL’s
shareholders are non-resident.11
The largest and probably only real
‘capital flight’ from the mineral sector in
Papua New Guinea is BHP Billiton’s
abandonment in 2001 of its 51 per cent
holding in Ok Tedi (OTML). That holding
has now been vested in a company for the
benefit of the people of Western Province (one
third) and the rest of Papua New Guinea.
Oil Search’s takeover in 2002 of Orogen
Minerals Ltd, 51 per cent of which is owned
by the Government of Papua New Guinea, in
effect amounted to a net new foreign invest-
ment in the mineral sector because of Oil
Search’s majority foreign ownership, with the
government receiving payment for its majority
holding partly in cash (125 million kina) and
partly in equity in Oil Search.
These shifts in foreign ownership of
mineral projects are perhaps a symptom of
lack of interest in developing new projects,
possibly because of perceived increased
sovereign risks in Papua New Guinea. The
new mining projects with the brightest
prospects are Ramu nickel, Frieda River
copper, Kainantu gold, and Hidden Valley
gold. Rights to the first three are all majority
owned by Highlands Pacific, which is
registered in Papua New Guinea and largely
owned by national entities.12 That is part of
the problem—Highlands lacks both the
financial and technical clout to push these
projects to development. Moreover, the nickel
project suffers from continuing world
oversupply and low prices, quite apart from
Table  6 Capital flows of Oil Search Ltd, 1991–2001 (million kina)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Use of funds
Net investing cash flows –56.9 –34.2 –26.9 –8.8 –105.4 –44.1 –125.6 –933.2 –175.5 –137.1–300.2
Sources of funds
Loan drawdowns (net) - 70.2 –24.0 –16.5 –43.7 0.0 72.7 644.4 –152.4 –160.5–133.3
State nominee ALa(net) –24.6 –4.8 12.7 11.8 10.0 0.0 25.5 - - - -
Equity proceeds 30.3 0.0 0.1 0.4 28.9 51.3 1.1 148.1 216.9 55.2 181.6
Total net capital flows
of OSL 5.7 65.4 –11.1 –4.4 –4.8 51.3 99.3 792.4 64.6 –105.3 48.3
Total private capital flows
(balance of payments) 113.0 –203.0 –704.0 –520.0 –531.0 44.0 117.0 –272.0 –289.0 –647.0–455.0
OSL (per cent of
balance of payments) 5.1 –32.2 1.6 0.8 0.9 116.5 84.9 –291.3 –22.3 16.3 –10.6
a Oil Search Ltd contributed a pro rata (10.017 per cent) share of the cost of the state’s 22.5 per cent
participation in the Kutubu project the amount provided was K24.56 million at December 1991; amounts
repaid by the State included accrued interest.
Source: Oil Search Ltd, various issues. Annual Report; Table 1 above.
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facing the opposition of non-government
organisations to all new mining projects in
Papua New Guinea after their success in
forcing BHP out of the Ok Tedi project in 2001
(Ramu would use the same tailings disposal
system deployed at Misima and Lihir that is
strongly criticised by Australia’s Mineral
Policy Institute). In addition, the successful
class actions mounted in Australia by the
Australian law firm Slater and Gordon
against BHP in 1995 over alleged environ-
mental damage at Ok Tedi not only led to
BHP’s divestment from this project but
certainly also increased the risks faced by
foreign investors in mining in Papua New
Guinea, perhaps far more than increases in
Papua New Guinea’s sovereign risk as such.
In a sense therefore the sovereign risks faced
by investors in mining in Papua New Guinea
are located in Australia.
Conclusions
The limitations of the conventional method
of measuring capital flight are well known,
particularly that it does not do much more
than deem reported ‘errors and omissions’
in balance of payments data to be capital
flight. At least in the case of Papua New
Guinea, the basic balance of payments data
on private capital movements provide a more
comprehensive picture of whether a given
country is a net investor abroad or a net
recipient of inward investment.
The following conclusions may
tentatively be drawn from the survey above.
• The conventional measure of capital
flight shows net inflows from 1976 to
1991 and capital flight in all years since
1991 other than 1997.
• The balance of payments data show
much larger recorded net inflows of total
private capital over the period to 1991,
followed by deficits in all years since
1991 except 1997.
• The most striking finding is that, although
there has been capital flight in Papua
New Guinea since 1991 when that is
broadly defined as total net private
capital flows, since 1990 there has been
a significant net inflow of equity
investment. This has, however, been
more than offset by a net outflow of
private debt, caused largely by the
depreciation of the kina since 1994. This
pattern is evident in Lihir ’s debt
repayments, which in kina terms blew
out to 793 million kina by 2001 against
the feasibility study projection of 394
million kina, even though the US dollar
amount was almost exactly in line with
the projection (US$292 million).
• BPNG data on equity investment in
Papua New Guinea show outflows (in
Australian dollar terms) only in 1994 and
1998, but these falls are mostly a result
of the large devaluations of the kina in
those years, which artificially deflate the
actual Australian dollar value of earlier
investments made when the kina was
stronger. This is why the BPNG data
conflict with the Australian data showing
significant continuing Australian equity
investment in Papua New Guinea until
at least 1999–2000.
Duncan (1995) reported Richardson’s
belief (1995) that net inflows of private capital
to Papua New Guinea would be resumed if
budget deficits were maintained at not more
than one per cent of GDP, the share of capital
spending in the total budget were increased,
the extent of tariff protection reduced, a peace
settlement in Bougainville achieved,
environmental disputes at Ok Tedi settled,
and structural adjustment programmes put
forward by the IMF and World Bank were
adopted. The government of Sir Mekere
Morauta, Prime Minister from July 1999 to
August 2002, could be said to have
implemented all of these desiderata by the
end of 2001, but at time of writing while net
outflows of private capital have diminished.
Papua New Guinea’s balance of payments
data for 2001 show a decline in net private
capital outflows, from 502 million kina in
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2000 to 238 million kina, almost all of which
was in the first quarter of 2001. Net inflows
of new capital remain absent. This implies
that further policy changes may need to be
considered by the new government led by
Sir Michael Somare before Papua New
Guinea again attracts foreign private
capital commensurate with its underlying
investment opportunities.
The slowing rate of net private capital
outflow during 2001 is perhaps a hopeful
sign, but until significant positive inflows
resume it is difficult to see the economy
emerging from the recession that began in
1997. Moreover, with mineral exploration at
a low ebb, it seems unlikely that the mineral
sector will again attract the large-scale
foreign investment enjoyed in the early to mid
1990s. The very large excess liquidity of
Papua New Guinea’s banking system, with
total advances in May 2002 at only 1.58
billion kina, just 317 million kina above the
level of liquid assets, and the remarkably low
levels of advances to the agriculture and
housing construction sectors (250 million
kina), suggest a serious shortage of investment
opportunities for both domestic and foreign
capital. This provides a strong case for
reforming land titling arrangements, a
process that will be vital if large-scale long-
term foreign and domestic investment is to be
drawn to non-mineral sectors such as
agriculture, forestry and construction.
Notes
1 This does not take into account the
reinvestment of profits, which means that
the residual value of foreign investment still
in Papua New Guinea is much larger than
the net flow of A$4 million.
2 ‘Coffee output rose by 0.4pc last year: CIC’,
Post-Courier, 15 May 2002:20; the BPNG data
showed coffee exports falling from 66,600
tons in 2000 to 51,500 tons in 2001. CIC’s data
showed export proceeds of 248 million kina
in 2002, against BPNG’s 188.6 million kina.
Timing differences could explain some but
perhaps not all of the discrepancy. One major
coffee exporter (Angco) was put into
receivership by BPNG when it failed to
repatriate proceeds of its sales abroad.
3 Personal communication with senior
management.
4 The project agreements for Porgera and
Kutubu allowed parent companies to deem
up to 75 per cent of their in-house financing
of the projects to be loans, for purposes of
capital repatriation and payment of tax-
deductible interest in lieu of dividends payable
only from after-tax profits.
5 Companies Act, cap.146, section 66. Since
1997 these provisions no longer apply.
6 The annual payments to the three private
Porgera Joint Venture partners reached as
much as 18 million kina in 1995.
7 Oil Search, Papua New Guinea’s largest
resident oil company, diversified recently by
investing in the Arabian Gulf, but its share
price has clearly suffered from its previous
total dependence on the Kutubu oilfield and
its adjuncts.
8 Not all of this was subscribed in Australia,
with major contributions from the United
States, Canada, and Papua New Guinea itself.
9 According to the report of the Ombudsman
(1999), the POSF paid A$19 million to its then
Australian owner for a building he had
purchased for A$8 million shortly before this
transaction. Such transactions are common-
place in Australia and would not occasion
comment had it not been that the vendor was
well aware of the intention of the government
to acquire this building before he purchased it.
1 0 Oil Search’s 20 largest shareholders held 67
per cent of the company at 28 February 2002;
all of these were Australian entities apart
from Papua New Guinea’s POSF, which held
0.8 per cent of the company.
1 1 LGL’s 20 largest shareholders held 81.38 per
cent of the company at 1 March 2002; these
included three PNG entities—Mineral
Resources Lihir Ltd (on behalf of the
landowners), 6.76 per cent; Orogen Minerals
Ltd (later Oil Search), 0.75 per cent; and POSF
0.58 per cent.
1 2 At 31 December 1998 institutions controlled
by the Government of Papua New Guinea
held 25 per cent of the share capital,
effectively the largest single interest.
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